1. Introduction 1
1.1. Overview 1
1.2. Schrödinger's Musings 2
1.3. A Brief Introduction to Metaphysics 7
1.3.1. A Brief History of Metaphysics 7
1.3.2. What is Metaphysics ? 10
1.4. Metaphysics and Metaphor 11
1.4.1. The `Root Metaphor' Theory 11
1.4.2. The `Roor Metaphor' Method 13
1.4.3. Problems with Metaphors 14
1.5. Computationalism 16
1.5.1. What is Computationalism ? 16
1.5.2. Computationalism and Artificiality 18
1.5.3. Computationalism and Emergence 21
1.6. Critique 24
1.6.1. Why Critique Computationalism ? 25
1.6.2. From Philosophy to Phenomenology 29
1.6.3. A Brief Introduction to Heideggerian Phenomenology 33
1.6.4. Why a Phenomenological Critique ? 47
1.6.5. Towards a Phenomenology of Poiesis 51
1.7. Thesis 66
1.8. Objectives 66
1.9. Strategy 67
1.10. Note to the Reader 68

Part I: Construction

2. Computationalism 70
2.1. Overview 70
2.2. What is Computation ? 71
2.3. Formal Systems 71
2.3.1. Definition 71
2.3.2. Interpretation of Formal Systems 72
2.3.3. Properties of Formal Systems 75
2.4. Computation 77
2.4.1. Effective Procedures 78
2.4.2. Turing Machines 78
2.4.3. Extensions to Turing Machines 80
2.4.4. Computability and Undecidability 80
2.4.5. Universality and The Universal Turing Machine (UTM) 82
2.4.6. The Church-Turing Thesis (CTT) 84
2.5. Computationalism 85
2.5.1. The Physical Symbol System Hypothesis (PSSH) 88
2.5.2. The Physical Church-Turing Thesis (PCTT) 90
2.5.3. The Finite Automaton Thesis (FAT) 93
2.5.4. Concepts of Computation 94
2.5.5. Definition: Computationalism 94
2.5.6. Analogue Devices and Connectionism 95
2.6. Implementing Computationalism 96
2.6.1. From Turing Machines to Cellular Automata 96
2.6.2. Cellular Automata and Computationalism 99
2.6.3. Definition: Cellular Automaton (CA) 100
2.6.4. Describing the Structure of CAs 103
2.6.5. Universal Cellular Automata (UCAs) 106
2.6.6. "Digital Mechanics" 106
2.6.7. Computationalism and The Physical World 108
2.7. Deconstructing Computationalism 109
2.7.1. Computers, Forms and Machines 109
2.7.2. Formism 110
2.7.3. Mechanism 112
2.7.4. Determinism 115
2.7.5. Atomism 117
2.7.6. A Note on Process Philosophy 118
2.7.7. Computationalism, Metaphor and Metaphysics 121

3. Emergence 123
3.1. Overview 123
3.2. What is Emergence ? 124
3.2.1. Motivation: The Unification of Artificiality 124
3.2.2. Definition: Emergence 125
3.2.3. Historical Background 126
3.2.4. Towards a Theory of Emergence 128
3.3. Self-Organization: Problems in Emergence 130
3.4. Basic Concepts 136
3.4.1. Systems 137
3.4.2. Hierarchies 139
3.4.3. Partitionings 141
3.4.4. Near-Decomposability 142
3.4.5. Complexity 144
3.5. The Phenomenology of Emergence 147
3.5.1. Concepts of Emergence 147
3.5.2. Types of Emergent 149
3.6. Formalism, Computationalism and Emergence 151
3.6.1. Basics 151
3.6.2. A Formal Framework for Emergence 152
3.6.3. Computational Emergence 153
3.6.4. Emergent Computation and Computational Emergence 154
3.6.5. Emergence in Cellular Automata (CAs) 156
3.7. Philosophical Issues: Introduction 157
3.7.1. Property-Emergence 157
3.7.2. Law-Emergence 157
3.8. Epistemological Issues 159
3.8.1. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Emergence 159
3.8.2. Observational-Relativism 163
3.8.3. Emergence and Reductionism 164
3.9. Ontological Issues 168
3.9.1. Open and Closed Emergence 168
3.9.2. From Emergence to Emergentism 172
3.9.3. Downwards Causation 174
3.9.3.1. Weak (dual control) 175
3.9.3.2. Logical (global constraints) 177
3.9.3.3. Strong (supplementary laws) 179
3.9.4. Pluralism 179

4. Artificiality 183
4.1. Overview 183
4.2. What is Artificiality ? 184
4.2.1. "The Sciences of the Artificial" 185
4.2.2. Artificiality and Functionalism 189
4.2.3. Artificiality and Computationalism 193
4.2.4. Unification of Domains 194
4.2.5. Problems with Simon's Concept 195
4.3. Artificial and Natural 198
4.3.1. What is Nature ? 198
4.3.2. Towards a New Concept of Artificiality 202
4.3.3. Simulation, Replication and Emulation 204
4.3.4. Simulation and Realization 207
4.3.5. "Strong" and "Weak" Artificiality 211
4.3.6. The Turing Test 213
4.3.7. Artificiality and Emergence 215
4.3.8. Functionalist Unification Reconsidered 216
4.4. Natural and Artificial Phenomena 217
4.5. Mind 220
4.5.1. What is Mind ? 220
4.5.2. Intelligence 222
4.5.3. Intentionality 223
4.5.4. Consciousness 224
4.5.5. The Other-Minds Problem 226
4.5.6. The Mind-Body Problem 228
4.5.7. A Functionalist Conception of Mind 230
4.5.8. The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) 232
4.5.9. Artificial Intelligence (AI) 236
4.5.10. Connections Between Mind and Life 238
4.6. Life 240
4.6.1. What is Life ? 240
4.6.2. Towards a Computational Theory of Life (CTL) 245
4.6.3. The Continuum Hypothesis 248
4.6.4. Life and Functionalism 251
4.6.5. Bedau's Concept of Life: A Case Study 253
4.6.6. Artificial Life (A-Life) 257
4.6.7. "Strong" and "Weak" A-Life 260
4.6.8. A Turing Test for Life 262
4.6.9. Problems with the CTL 265
4.6.9.1. Abstraction 265
4.6.9.2. Physicality 268
4.6.9.3. Embeddedness 270
4.6.9.4. Hermeneutics 272
4.6.9.5. Morphization 273
4.6.10. Connections Between Life and Matter 275
4.7. Matter 275
4.7.1. What is Matter ? 276
4.7.2. Classical Physics 278
4.7.3. The Theory of Relativity 280
4.7.3.1. The Special Theory of Relativity 280
4.7.3.2. The General Theory of Relativity 282
4.7.3.3. Beyond Relativity Theory 283
4.7.4. Quantum Theory 284
4.7.4.1. The Double-Slit Experiment 285
4.7.4.2. The Uncertainty Principle 286
4.7.4.3. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) Experiment 287
4.7.4.4. The Measurement and Interpretation Problems 287
4.7.4.5. The `Hidden Variables' Interpretation 288
4.7.5. Thermodynamics 289
4.7.6. A Computational Theory of Matter (CTMa) 290
4.7.6.1. Thermodynamics and Self-Organization 292
4.7.6.2. The Physical Church Turing Thesis (PCTT) 293
4.7.6.3. Wheeler's `Meaning Circuit' 294
4.7.6.4. Artificial Physics (A-Physics) 297
4.7.7. Matter and Intentionality 298
4.8. Reality 300
4.8.1. What is Reality ? 300
4.8.2. Artificial (or Virtual) Reality (A/VR) 300
4.8.3. A Turing Test for Reality 302
4.8.4. The Ontological Status of Virtual Worlds 304

5. Unification 307
5.1. Overview 307
5.2. Towards Unifying Artificality 308
5.2.1. Artificiality as Unifier and Unified 310
5.2.2. The Teleology Problem Revisited 311
5.3. Towards a Unification of Artificiality 312
5.3.1. Unification as Idea and Ideal 313
5.3.2. Issues in Unification 314
5.3.3. Bunge's Approaches to Unification 317
5.3.4. Problems with Bunge's Framework 322
5.4. Alexander's Metaphysics 324
5.4.1. Introduction 324
5.4.2. Space-Time 326
5.4.3. Categories 333
5.4.3.1. Identity, Diversity, Exstence 335
5.4.3.2. Universality 336
5.4.3.3. Relation 338
5.4.3.4. Substance 340
5.4.3.5. Causality 342
5.4.3.6. Motion 342
5.4.4. Emergence 343
5.4.5. Matter 348
5.4.6. Life 349
5.4.7. Mind 350
5.4.7.1. Consciousness 351
5.4.7.2. Determinism 354
5.4.8. From Space-Time to CA-Computationalism 356
5.5. Computationally Emergent Artificiality (CEA) 356
5.5.1. Cellular Automata (CAs) Reviewed 357
5.5.1.1. Finitude 357
5.5.1.2. Universality 358
5.5.1.3. Emergence 359
5.5.1.4. Hierarchies 360
5.5.2. Why CEA is Possible 361
5.5.3. Towards CEA: The Game of Life (GOL) 362
5.5.3.1. GOL-Matter 363
5.5.3.2. GOL-Life 364
5.5.3.3. GOL-Mind 365
5.5.4. Problems with the GOL 365
5.5.5. Reversible and Irreversible CAs 366
5.5.5.1. Implementing Reversibility 368
5.5.5.2. Billiard-Ball Mechanics (BBM) 370
5.5.5.3. BBM-CA 374
5.5.6. CA-Matter 375
5.5.6.1. Digital Mechanics (DM) Revisited 377
5.5.7. CA-Life 381
5.5.7.1. Self-Reproduction 382
5.5.7.2. Evolution 386
5.5.7.3. Autonomy 387
5.5.7.4. CA-Matter to CA-Life. How ? 388
5.5.8. CA-Mind 388
5.5.9. Emergence and Embedding 391
5.5.9.1. Conditions for Embedding 393
5.5.9.2. The RCA®NRCA Problem 396
5.6. CA-Computationalism: Beyond Alexander 401
5.6.1. Logical Necessity 401
5.6.2. Explanation of Emergence 402
5.6.3. Identity as Empirical 403
5.6.4. A CA model of Alexanderian Space-Time incorporating reversibility 403

Part II: Deconstruction

6. Poiesis 405
6.1. Overview 405
6.2. Introduction 406
6.2.1. Computationalism as "Digital Metaphysics" 409
6.3. The Question Concerning CEA 412
6.3.1. On the Essence of Questioning as such 413
6.3.2. Previous Questioning Concerning Artificiality 414
6.3.3. Questioning Concerning CEA 419
6.4. Ontical Poiesis 421
6.4.1. Basic Concepts 421
6.4.1.1. Process and Change 421
6.4.1.2. Becoming 424
6.4.1.3. Causation 429
6.4.2. Types of Poiesis 438
6.4.2.1. Evolution 439
6.4.2.2. Self-Organization 462
6.4.2.3. Creation 470
6.4.2.4. Making 493
6.4.3. Computational Poiesis 503
6.4.4. Emergence and the Ex Nihilo Maxims 514
6.4.5. Summary 522
6.5. Heidegger's Phenomenology of Being 524
6.5.1. The Question of Being 525
6.5.2. Being as such (Seyn) 530
6.5.3. Being and There-Being (Dasein) 554
6.5.4. Being (Sein) and beings (Seiendes) 588
6.5.5. Being and Nothing (Nichts) 629
6.5.6. Being and Thinking (Logos) 656
6.5.7. Being and Appearance 667
6.5.8. Being and Becoming 682
6.6. Ontological Poiesis 688
6.6.1. From Ontical to Ontological Poiesis 689
6.6.2. Physis 697
6.6.3. Techne 718
6.6.4. The Poietic Difference 752
6.6.5. Poiesis and Autopoiesis: A Comparison 763
6.7. Towards Pluralistic Emergentism 774
6.7.1. Structuralist-Emergentism 774
6.7.2. Physicalist-Emergentism 782
6.7.3. Pragmatist-Emergentism 790
6.7.4. Heideggerian-Emergentism 797

7. Critique 802
7.1. Overview 802
7.2. Phenomenological Framework 804
7.2.1. The Anthropic Component 804
7.2.2. Ontic and Epistemic Relationality 818
7.3. The Phenomenology of Artificiality 833
7.3.1. "Hard" and "Soft" Artificiality 833
7.3.2. Computers and "Hard" Artificiality 842
7.3.3. "Hard" Emergent Artifacts and The Poietic Difference 848
7.3.4. Computational and Ontological Emergence 854
7.4. Computationalism and The Category Problem 859
7.4.1. Ontological Subjectivity 859
7.4.2. The Category Problem 861
7.4.3. Computationalism, Emergence and the Category Problem 865
7.4.4. Techne-Enframing (Gestellen) and The Category Problem 869
7.4.5. A Heiddegerian Solution to the Other-Minds Problem 873

Part III: Reconstruction

8. Conclusions 876
8.1. Overview 876
8.2. Summary 877
8.3. Contributions 884
8.4. Shortcomings 885
8.5. Conclusions and Recommendations 887

Glossary 890

Bibliography 891