A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Syed Mustafa Ali.
Department of Electrical & Electronic Engineering, Brunel University.
January 1999.

ABSTRACT

This dissertation provides a critique of computationalism, the pervasive belief that all real-world phenomena are computational in essence. It is maintained herein that computationalism is an abstract or ideal metaphysics that is artificial in essence. Previous critiques of artificialities (such as artificial intelligence and artificial life) have assumed that the genesis (or becoming) of a being is discontinuously related to its essence. It is argued that this mistaken assumption has led to a tacit endorsement of functionalism, multiple-realizability and the possibility of "strong" artificiality (that is, phenomenal instantiation as opposed to mere simulation).

The critique is based upon an interpretation of the concept of poiesis (becoming) as presented by Heidegger in his later works. Heideggerian phenomenology (ontology) is used to distinguish artificial (as artifactual) from natural phenomena. Two concepts of poiesis are identified: ontical (causal, productive) and ontological (existential, incipient). The former is differentiated into four kinds (evolution, self-organization, creation and making) and each is shown to be incapable of supporting ontological emergence. Three types of ontological poiesis are identified: (i) the becoming of natural beings, (ii) the becoming of artificial beings, and (iii) Being or the originary becoming of beings as such. Natural beings are shown to be capable of ontological emergence on account of their standing in continuous relation with Being (which is ontologically open and infinite). Artificial beings, by contrast, are shown to be incapable of such emergence on account of their discontinuous relation to Being.

The poietic difference between natural and artificial beings is explicated via a framework of historical productive and interpretative relations between phenomena and the human artificer-interpreter. This framework is used (i) to distinguish between "hard" (or completely-specified) and "soft" (or incompletely-specified) artificiality and (ii) to identify computationalism as the defining exemplar of the former. It is shown that there is no distinction between designed and emergent "hard" artifacts with respect to their poietic difference from corresponding natural phenomena.