This paper has three parts. In the first part, a brief historical background and various modern formulations of the concept of emergence are presented. A number of problems associated with the concept are identified. One outstanding problem involves the incommensurability of secondary qualities (or phenomenal qualia) with materialist (externalist) ontologies. The intractability of this problem with respect to existing scientific approaches is an indicator of ontological category error, in this case, an attempt to subsume subjectivity into objectivity. In the second part, various attempts at solving the mind-body problem (of which the subjectivity-objectivity issue is a modern incarnation) are investigated and shown to be problematic. It is argued that these problems necessitate reconsidering the metaphysical foundations upon which the concept of emergence is grounded. In the third part, the notion of emergence is reconsidered and a new theory grounded in a synthesis of Heideggerian and Whiteheadian metaphysics is outlined.
The earliest articulation of the essence of emergence may well be the ancient Greek maxim `the whole is more than the sum of the parts' and historical links to the notion of self-organization are traceable to the writings of the pre-Socratics Thales and Anaximander. The first serious attempt at investigating the concept of emergence was not made until the middle of the nineteenth century when G.H.Lewes distinguished between resultants and emergents: in the former, the sequence of steps which produce a phenomenon are traceable while in the latter they are not. Lewes could be interpreted as identifying emergence with the epistemological limitations of an observer. In C.L.Morgan's Emergent Evolution (1923), emergence was identified with novelty while J.C.Smuts', writings in Holism and Evolution (1926) identified it with the generation of stable wholes. Samuel Alexander's Space, Time and Deity (1920), in which emergence was identified with the tendency for things to arrange themselves into new patterns which as organized wholes possess new types of structure and properties, provides the basis for information- theoretic and computationalist interpretations of the concept (Baas,93) (Darley,94). Nagel (1961), following Lewes, defines emergence in epistemological terms. This position is consistent with the adoption of a scientific (materialist) metaphysics and reflected in a commitment to ontological reductionism, the view that emergent phenomena do not contradict physical laws and, moreover, are causally determined by such laws. Consequently, non-materialistic theories of emergence are rejected a priori on the grounds that "emergents are regarded as spiritual creations emanating from an unknown shadowy world." (Kenyon,41) However, ontological reductionism does not entail epistemological reductionism: for example, Mayr (1982) defines emergence as the appearance of new characteristics in wholes that cannot be deduced from the most complete knowledge of the parts, taken separately or in other partial combinations. Similarly, Churchland (1985) defines emergence in terms of the irreducibility of properties associated with a higher level theory to properties associated with components in a lower level theory. Bottom-up causation and epistemological non-reductionism are the defining characteristics of most modern theories of emergence, computationalist or otherwise: in support of the former, Langton (1989) defines emergence in terms of a feedback relation between the levels in a dynamical system: local microdynamics cause global macrodynamics while global macrodynamics constrain local microdynamics; in support of the latter, Cariani (1991), who distinguishes three concepts of emergence, viz. computational, thermodynamic and relative-to-a- model, follows Rosen (1985) in identifying emergence with the deviation of the behaviour of a system from an observer's model of it.
Despite an a priori commitment to materialism, there are a number of outstanding problems associated with the concept of emergence which can be briefly stated in the form of a list of opposing metaphysical propositions: (1) realism-relativism (Rosen,76); (2) continuity-discreteness (Cariani,91); (3) monism-pluralism (Bunge,69); (4) causality-epiphenomenality (Sperry,87) (Searle,92); (5) determinism-indeterminism (Elstob,84); (6) reversibility-irreversibility (Prigogine,84); (7) computability- noncomputability (Baas,93); (8) closure-openness (Cariani,89) (Ali,96); (9) intrinsicality-extrinsicality (Crutchfield,94). The intrinsicality-extrinsicality issue is particularly interesting since it leads directly to the problem of observation. Crutchfield (1995) defines observation in terms of the embedding of models within endophysical observers, that is, observers existing within a closed physical system or `universe'. He maintains that extrinsic emergence, in which a phenomenon is identified as emergent by an exophysical observer, leads to an infinite regress of observers in much the same way that the collapse of the wave function in the Schr”dinger's Cat gedanken experiment by an observer necessitates a second observer to collapse the wave function of the larger system incorporating the first observer and so on. Crutchfield's solution to the regression problem associated with extrinsic emergence is to fold the regress into the system. This leads to a position similar to that of the participatory interpretation of the measurement problem in quantum theory: the universe gives rise to observers who in turn are responsible for collapsing the wave function describing the universe. It is important to note that this concept of observation is objectivist, not merely in the `weak' epistemological sense implying universal (necessary) as opposed to particular (contingent), but also in the `strong' ontological sense that implies externality or `third-personhood'. There are (at least) two related problems with this position: (1) Emergence depends on complexity, complexity on degree of abstraction, and abstraction on the intentionality of an observer/abstractionist. Is it meaningful to speak of intentionality (directedness) in the absence of consciousness (Searle,92) (Tallis,94) ? (2) Consciousness is a phenomenon that is subjective, internal, experiential and first-person. How can the external and non- experiential give rise to the internal and experiential ? Nagel (1974) maintains that those things of which I am conscious, and the ways in which I am conscious of them, determine what it is like to be me. Those that have consciousness are subjects, beings to whom things can be one way or another, beings it is like something to be. Subjects have experiences, feelings, sensations, in short secondary qualities or qualia. Griffin (1988) maintains that subjectivity and objectivity belong to orthogonal ontological categories and that any attempt at deriving the former from the latter is an instance of category error. It is simply the case that ontological subjectivity is irreducible (ontologically, methodologically and epistemologically) to ontological objectivity. Thus, emergence, with its necessary link to observation (Ayala,85) (Baas,93), leads directly to the mind- body problem.
The mind-body problem is simply the problem of relating subjective, internal, mental phenomena to objective, external, material phenomena. Various solutions to the problem have been proposed, beginning, perhaps with Descartes' invocation of a `God-of-the-gaps' maintaining the link (located in the pineal gland within the brain) between the res cogitans or mental substance and the res extensa or material substance. Dualistic theories fall broadly into two categories depending on the way in which the link between mind and matter is viewed: (1) interactionism - mind and matter are causally connected; (2) psychophysical parallelism (Spinoza) - mind and matter are causally disconnected, merely remaining in operational `harmony' with each other. Aesthetic dissatisfaction with dualism leads to two kinds of monism: (1) physicalism or materialism and (2) idealism or mentalism; in the former, matter is ontologically primitive, whereas in the latter, mind is ontologically primordial. Physicalism gives rise to a number of positions ranging from naive identism (in which mental states are held to be identical with brain states) through to behaviourism and eliminative materialism, in which mental phenomena are rendered either non-existent or `folk psychological'. All of these positions are problematic: identism since it fails to explain the link between mental states and brain states, establishing, at best, a mere correlation between the two orders of phenomena; behaviourism and eliminative materialism are problematic since they reject subjectivity outright, thereby reducing human beings to the level of zombies (Searle,92). Idealism is problematic because under a solipsistic interpretation (my mind is the only thing that exists) it fails to explain the subject-object distinction.
Proponents of the emergent theory of mind (ETM) such as Searle (1992) maintain that the mind (consciousness) emerges from the body (brain) as a consequence of bottom-up causal neurophysiological processes. The ETM describes the mind-body relation in terms of a two-level systemic hierarchy: the pattern of neuronal `firings' in the brain (lower, local or substrate level) give rise to mental phenomena including (but not limited to) the subjective experience of consciousness (higher, global, or emergent level). Proponents of the computational ETM go further and assert that the formal aspect of bottom-up causation, viz. the pattern of neuronal activation, provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for the emergence of consciousness. This position, which is grounded in the theory of emergence due to Alexander, is consistent with functionalism and supports the possibility of artificial consciousness. However, Searle (1992) has contested the computationalist isomorphism, "mind is to brain as software is to hardware", on the grounds that three of the terms (brain, software, hardware) are completely definable in objective terms while the fourth term (mind) necessitates description, at least partially, in subjective terms. Assuming biological-naturalism, Searle advances the following homology: brain states are to mental states as molecular behaviour is to liquidity. However, Tallis (1994) has, in turn, contested this position, maintaining that the latter two terms (molecular behaviour and liquidity) are necessarily on the same side of the mind-matter divide: material (objective) if viewed as intrinsic properties of water; mental (subjective) if viewed as different ways of experiencing/observing water. The assumption of bottom-up causation, which entails an epiphenomal view of mind, has been contested by Sperry (1987) who has examined the link between consciousness and causality in connection with an emergentist solution to the mind-body problem. Sperry describes his position as emergentist, functionalist, interactionist, and monistic. Mind, a spatio-temporal pattern of mass-energy, is identified with subjective meaning which is held to be a causally- supervenient emergent property of neuro-physiological processes. The view that material-efficient causation constitutes a closed system is rejected; mind is held to functionally constrain the neurophysiological substrate from which it emerges. Hence, formal-final causation allows for top-down causation. Sperry follows Polanyi (1966) in defining the formal-final causality of mind in field-theoretic terms as an autonomous boundary condition. On this view, emergence necessarily involves creatio ex nihilo, that is, creation from nothing since higher level fields are held to be ontologically non-reductive to lower level fields. However, there is also the problem of ex nihilo, nihil fit or `from nothing, nothing comes' which can be reinterpreted in the context of the subjectivity-objectivity problem as `from the non-experiential, the non-experiential comes'. Thus, the problem of secondary qualities or qualia again arises in the context of emergentism. It would appear, therefore, that the only possible solution to the mind-body problem which does not entail a category error is some form of panpsychism in which the most primitive ontological components in the universe are held to possess both internal (subjective) and external (objective) subjective aspects (Nagel,86). However, panpsychism (or animism) conflicts with some of our most basic assumptions regarding the problem of other-minds, viz. the problem of determining whether or not any entities other than myself possess minds: although the ascription of consciousness on the basis of external behaviour alone is problematic (Searle,80), surely there is some connection between consciousness and external behaviour ? A denial of this position would entail holding that entities such as stones and clouds are conscious. What is required is an emergentist variant of panpsychism which (1) supports the ontological irreducibility of subjectivity (thereby solving the mind-body problem) and (2) is consistent with a phenomenal hierarchy in which matter, life and mind are viewed as qualitatively distinct from an objective, behaviouristic perspective (thereby preventing conflict with the intuitive requirement for inclusion of behavioural criteria in the solution of the other-minds problem.)
It is argued that the apparent incommensurability of emergentist and panpsychist accounts is a consequence of adopting a monistic, materialistic, and atomistic metaphysics. Etymological analysis of the notion of emergence reveals an alternative and historically antecedent interpretation of the concept which renders the positions commensurable. The Oxford Latin Dictionary (1982) provides the following etymology for emergence: emergo ~gere 2. to come forth (from confinement, concealment), emerge. 4. to become apparent, come to light; (of something unexpected) to turn up, present itself, to appear as a result, to emanate. Adopting the hermeneutic approach to philosophical investigation pioneered by Heidegger and questioning concerning emergence reveals two possibilities for emergence: (1) emergence1 - a transition from something to something smaller and (2) emergence2 - a transition from something to something larger. The former is associated with the abstraction or `cutting' of ontological categories from a poi tic (generative) categorial source while the latter is associated with the manifestation of categorial potentiality once ontological categories have been defined. Heidegger's ontological analysis of Being (1959) leads to a definition of emergence in terms of the poi sis or coming-forth from concealment of physis, the originary power of Being and establishes emergence1 as a necessary condition for emergence2. Being is not to be thought of in terms of a whole composed from parts; Being is the primordial ground of parts and wholes, in fact, of all that is. To exist (or `be') is to partake of Being. Consequently, emergence takes two forms: (1) Heideggerian interpretation - ontological-contraction, a movement between Being and beings/essents/things; (2) conventional interpretation - phenomenal-expansion, a movement between essents and essents. Atoms (parts) are contractive emergents from Being, that is, `cuttings' of type cutting1 defined as a Being-essentpart transition. Systems (wholes) are expansive emergents from atoms, that is, `joinings' of type joining2 defined as an essentpart- essentwhole transition. (Systems can also be viewed as contractive emergents from Being, again, as `cuttings' of type cutting1.) Analysis or the isolation of components (parts) from wholes is a contractive form of emergence, that is, a `cutting' of a different order than that of originary (ontological) `cutting' and is defined as cutting2, an essentwhole-essentpart transition. An originary `joining' of type joining1 defined as an essent-Being transition is necessitated in the event of the emergence of category error; this originary joining corresponds to a revision of metaphysical assumptions and the adoption of new ontological primitives. The entire process constitutes a hermeneutic spiral which is exemplified in the context of the mind-body problem as follows: (1) objective, external atoms are defined as ontologically primitive (cutting1); (2) objective physical-biological systems emerge from the atomic substrate (joining2); (3) biological systems with subjectivity emerge leading to a category problem; (4) the category problem is projected back to the ontological primitives (cutting2); (5) ontological primitives are re-defined so as to solve the category problem (joining1). In this case, Whiteheadian actual occasions (experiential events) are postulated as the newly emerging categorial primitives (cutting1). Panexperientialism solves the mind-body problem and is consistent with intuitions regarding the other minds problem because it enables genuine individuals (in which internal experience and external behaviour are manifested) to be distinguished from mere aggregates (in which the microscopic experience of parts is cancelled out in the macroscopic whole) on the basis of form or organization. Hence, panexperientialism is consistent with a modified functionalism.
Although Heidegger denies the ontological primacy of subjective reflective consciousness with respect to human being (Dasein), this does not imply that objects are ontologically primitive and subjects ontologically derivative nor that Being (as the ground of all beings) is ontologically objective; according to Heidegger, it is the dualism of subjects and objects that is secondary, emerging in the event of `breakdown'. (The three degrees of breakdown (Dreyfus,92) can be shown to be very similar to the three types of emergence-relative-to-a-model described by Umerez et al. (1993).) It is argued that Being conceals consciousness; that consciousness is not created (ex nihilo) but revealed and that this is the primordial interpretation of emergence, viz. as unconcealment. Consciousness is, therefore, a mode of Being awaiting unconcealment through the hermeneutic process. This position derives support from Whiteheadian organicism (panexperientialism): there are no such things as ontological subjects and objects (or superjects); subjectivity and objectivity (superjectivity) refer to different temporal aspects of experiential events (actual occasions).
It is maintained that the primordial act is the drawing of a distinction (Spencer-Brown,69) which has the dual consequence of revealing certain modes of Being while at the same time concealing other modes; it is the hermeneutic process which is responsible for the movement between concealment and unconcealment. Furthermore, it is claimed that the Heideggerian conception of Being enables the creatio ex nihilo and ex nihilo nihil fit problems to be resolved: whether creatio ex nihilo is possible depends on how nothing is defined. Necessary and sufficient conditions for creatio ex nihilo include (1) nothing (void) (Randall,96) and (2) a `cutter' or distinction-maker (Spencer-Brown,69). Nothing can be defined as no-thing or no- being or not-Being, where Being is identified with the distinction-maker. This position is consistent with Heidegger's assertion that nothing is negatively defined with respect to Being; consequently, nothing presupposes Being; ex nihilo nihil fit can be taken to imply that in the absence of a `cutter' or distinction-maker, there can be no creation or emergence. Thus, creatio ex nihilo and ex nihilo nihil fit are commensurable positions.
Keywords: Emergence, ontology, mind-body problem, Whiteheadian panexperientialism, Heideggerian hermeneutics.